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Misinformation and disinformation

Malicious use and abuse (military applications)

Regulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AI

G'sell (2024)

SourceDOI
Sub-category
Risk Domain
4Malicious Actors & Misuse
4.2Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm

Using AI systems to develop cyber weapons (e.g., by coding cheaper, more effective malware), develop new or enhance existing weapons (e.g., Lethal Autonomous Weapons or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives), or use weapons to cause mass harm.

"The advancement of AI for military purposes is rapidly ushering in a new phase of growth in military technology. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) possess the capability to detect, engage, and eliminate human targets independently, without human input.341 In 2020, a sophisticated AI agent surpassed experienced F-16 pilots in multiple simulated aerial combat scenarios, notably achieving a 5-0 victory against a human pilot through “aggressive and precise maneuvers” that the human could not surpass.342 Additionally, fully autonomous drones are already operational."(p. 77)

Entity— Who or what caused the harm

Human

Due to a decision or action made by humans

AI system

Due to a decision or action made by an AI system

Other

Due to some other reason or is ambiguous

Intent— Whether the harm was intentional or accidental

Intentional

Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal

Unintentional

Due to an unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal

Other

Without clearly specifying the intentionality

Timing— Whether the risk is pre- or post-deployment

Pre-deployment

Occurring before the AI is deployed

Post-deployment

Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed

Other

Without a clearly specified time of occurrence

Supporting Evidence (1)

1.
Although it does not always directly involve generative AI, the deployment of advanced AI technologies by military forces raises significant concerns due to their enhanced capabilities and the potential implications these tools present.(p. 77)

Other risks from G'sell (2024) (33)

Technical and operational risks

7.3 Lack of capability or robustness
AI systemUnintentionalOther

Technical and operational risks > Technical vulnerabilities (Robustness - unexpected behaviour)

7.3 Lack of capability or robustness
AI systemOtherPost-deployment

Technical and operational risks > Technical vulnerabilities (Robustness - vulnerability to jailbreaking

2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks
HumanIntentionalPost-deployment

Technical and operational risks > Technical vulnerabilities (The risk of misalignment)

7.1 AI pursuing its own goals in conflict with human goals or values
AI systemOtherPost-deployment

Technical and operational risks > Factually incorrect content (inaccuracies and fabricated sources)

3.1 False or misleading information
AI systemUnintentionalPost-deployment

Technical and operational risks > Opacity (the black box problem)

7.4 Lack of transparency or interpretability
OtherUnintentionalOther
View all 33 risks from this paper →