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Red teaming, capability evaluations, adversarial testing, and performance verification.
Also in Risk & Assurance
Just as medical researchers use mice with induced diseases to safely study potential treatments before testing them on humans, AI safety researchers can create simplified AI systems to verify if safety methods are effective. These ‘model organisms’ are designed to allow controlled studies of specific safety issues that could emerge in more advanced AI systems (Hubinger-D). For example, researchers have created AI models with hidden “backdoors” that cause harmful behaviour only when given a specific trigger – simulating behaviour that malicious actors could insert or that models sometimes develop naturally (Greenblatt-A). This allows them to test whether safety measures can detect such behaviour (Marks). Companies can use this setup internally, but external parties can also create model organisms to audit the effectiveness of the safety methods used internally. Despite its importance, one survey study identified that this research area is still underrepresented (Delaney).
Reasoning
Creates simplified AI systems to test whether safety measures effectively detect problematic behaviors through controlled evaluation.
Risk Assessment
The primary goal of risk assessment is to understand the severity and likelihood of a potential harm. Risk assessments are used to prioritise risks and determine if they cross thresholds that demand specific action. Consequential development and deployment decisions are predicated on these assessments. The research areas in this category involve: A. Developing methods to measure the impact of AI systems for both current and future AI – This includes developing standardised assessments for risky behaviours of AI systems through audit techniques and benchmarks, evaluation and assessment of new capabilities, including potentially dangerous ones; and for real-world societal impact such as labour, misinformation and privacy through field tests and prospective risks analysis. B. Enhancing metrology to ensure that the measurements are precise and repeatable – This includes research in technical methods for quantitative risk assessment tailored to AI systems to reduce uncertainty and the need for large safety margins. This is an important open area of research. C. Building enablers for third-party audits to support independent validation of risk assessments – This includes developing secure infrastructure that enables thorough evaluation while protecting intellectual property, including preventing model theft.
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Audit techniques and benchmarks
Techniques and benchmarks with which AI systems can be effectively and efficiently tested for harmful behaviours are highly varied and central to risk assessments (IAISR, Birhane-A).
3.2.1 Benchmarks & EvaluationRisk Assessment > Downstream impact assessment and forecasting
Assessing and forecasting the many societal impacts of AI systems is one of the most central goals of risk assessments.
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Secure evaluation infrastructure
External auditors and oversight bodies need infrastructure and protocols that enable thorough evaluation while protecting sensitive intellectual property. Ideally, evaluation infrastructure should enable double-blindness: the evaluator’s inability to directly access the system’s parameters and developers’ inability to know what exact evaluations are run (Reuel, Bucknall-A, Casper-B). Meanwhile, the importance of mutual security will continue to grow as system capabilities and risks increase. Methods for developing secure infrastructure for auditing and oversight are known to be possible.
3.2.2 Technical StandardsRisk Assessment > System safety assessment
Safety assessment is not just about individual AI systems, but also their interaction with the rest of the world. For example, when an AI company discovers concerning behaviour from their system, the resulting risks depend, in part, on having internal processes in place to escalate the issue to senior leadership and work to mitigate the risks. System safety considers both AI systems and the broader context that they are deployed in. The study of system safety focuses on the interactions between different technical components as well as processes and incentives in an organisation (IAISR, Hendrycks-B, AISES, Alaga).
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Metrology for AI risk assessment
Metrology, the science of measurement, has only recently been studied in the context of AI risk assessment (IAISR, Hobbhahn). Current approaches generally lack standardisation, repeatability, and precision.
3.2.1 Benchmarks & EvaluationThe Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities
Bengio, Yoshua; Maharaj, Tegan; Ong, C.-H. Luke; Russell, Stuart D.; Song, Dawn; Tegmark, Max; Lan, Xue; Zhang, Ya-Qin; Casper, Stephen; Lee, Wan Sie; Mindermann, Sören; Wilfred, Vanessa; Balachandran, Vidhisha; Barez, Fazl; Belinsky, Michael; Bello, Imane; Bourgon, Malo; Brakel, Mark; Campos, Siméon; Cass-Beggs, Duncan; Chen, Jiahao; Chowdhury, Rumman; Seah, Kuan Chua; Clune, Jeff; Dai, Jie; Delaborde, Agnes; Dziri, Nouha; Eiras, Francisco; Engels, Joshua; Fan, Jinyu; Gleave, Adam; Goodman, Noah D.; Heide, Fynn; Heidecke, Johannes; Hendrycks, Dan; Hodes, Cyrus; Hsiang, Bryan Low Kian; Huang, Minlie; Jawhar, Sami; Wang, Jingyu; Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kamphuis, Meindert; Kankanhalli, Mohan; Kantamneni, Subhash; Kirk, M.; Kwa, Thomas; Ladish, Jeffrey; Lam, Kwok-Yan; Lee, Wan Sie; Lee, Taewhi; Li, Xiaopeng; Liu, Jiajun; Lu, Ching-Cheng; Mai, Yifan; Mallah, Richard; Michael, Julian; Moës, Nick; Møller, Simon Geir; Nam, K. H.; Ng, TP; Nitzberg, Mark; Nushi, Besmira; Ó hÉigeartaigh, Seán; Ortega, Alejandro; Peigné, Pierre; Petrie, J. Howard; Prud'homme, Benjamin; Rabbany, Reihaneh; Sanchez-Pi, Nayat; Schwettmann, Sarah; Shlegeris, Buck; Siddiqui, Saad; Sinha, Ashish; Soto, Martín; Tan, Cheston; Dong, Ting; Tjhi, William; Trager, Robert; Tse, Brian; Tung, Anthony K. H.; Willes, John; Wong, David; Xu, Wei; Xu, Rong; Zeng, Yi; Zhang, Hao; Žikelić, Djordje (2025)
This is the first International AI Safety Report. Following an interim publication in May 2024, a diverse group of 96 Artificial Intelligence (AI) experts contributed to this first full report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). The report aims to provide scientific information that will support informed policymaking. It does not recommend specific policies…. This report summarises the scientific evidence on the safety of general-purpose AI. The purpose of this report is to help create a shared international understanding of risks from advanced AI and how they can be mitigated. To achieve this, this report focuses on general-purpose AI – or AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks – since this type of AI has advanced particularly rapidly in recent years and has been deployed widely by technology companies for a range of consumer and business purposes. The report synthesises the state of scientific understanding of general-purpose AI, with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. Amid rapid advancements, research on general-purpose AI is currently in a time of scientific discovery, and – in many cases – is not yet settled science. The report provides a snapshot of the current scientific understanding of general-purpose AI and its risks. This includes identifying areas of scientific consensus and areas where there are different views or gaps in the current scientific understanding. People around the world will only be able to fully enjoy the potential benefits of general- purpose AI safely if its risks are appropriately managed. This report focuses on identifying those risks and evaluating technical methods for assessing and mitigating them, including ways that general-purpose AI itself can be used to mitigate risks.
Verify and Validate
Testing, evaluating, auditing, and red-teaming the AI system
Developer
Entity that creates, trains, or modifies the AI system
Measure
Quantifying, testing, and monitoring identified AI risks
