This page is still being polished. If you have thoughts, please share them via the feedback form.
Data on this page is preliminary and may change. Please do not share or cite these figures publicly.
Shared benchmarks, datasets, standards, and resources that produce adoptable artifacts. These are public goods that reduce transaction costs for any organization that adopts them, without requiring coordination or enforcement.
Also in Ecosystem
Just as system monitoring techniques help AI developers oversee their systems, techniques for monitoring the broader AI ecosystem help stakeholders in society oversee the field of AI. Methods for ecosystem monitoring support the identification and tracking of AI systems and data. In turn, this can facilitate accountability infrastructure, support greater public understanding, and enable more informed governance.
Reasoning
Ecosystem monitoring tracks AI systems across organizations to enable accountability and governance coordination among multiple stakeholders.
Tracing usage patterns
One key, high-level lens into how AI systems impact the world is through usage monitoring (e.g. Anthropic-A). By collecting and monitoring data on how users access, download, and/or interact with frontier systems, AI service providers can gather insights about potential impacts and risks. However, key challenges with tracking usage include privacy preservation, infrastructure for sharing insights, and effective tools for identifying potential risks.
2.3.3 Monitoring & LoggingData provenance
Various techniques can help to identify AI-generated content and are a principal defence against AI deepfakes and misinformation. Methods include developing reliable classifiers of AI-generated content, watermarking AI-generated data (images, video, audio, and text) (Cao), and tagging AI-generated data with metadata to indicate its origin. These techniques are inherently imperfect – they can be undone by tampering with data. However, in forensic science, similar techniques like fingerprinting are also circumventable but useful nonetheless. Further progress on these methods will involve both more reliable methods for data provenance and their integration into AI products and services.
1.2.5 Provenance & WatermarkingModel provenance
Tools for model provenance help to identify and track AI models – especially open-weight ones. Most notably, these tools help researchers study the origins and lifecycle of harmful models in the ecosystem. Methods for model provenance involve techniques to help users and AI providers ascertain the identity and origin of a model. This can include black-box methods, such as identification backdoors (Cheng), identifiable biases in text generation (Kirchenbauer), and white-box methods, such as model weight watermarks. Much like data provenance methods, model provenance methods can be circumvented, but they can be informative in many cases nonetheless. Research frontiers include studying how stable these techniques are under fine-tuning and other modifications to a model’s weights. Engineering efforts may also be needed to integrate these techniques into model development and platform infrastructure
1.2.5 Provenance & WatermarkingAgent authentication
Some protocols can allow for the verification of AI agent identities while they are using web services. As AI systems become increasingly capable and agentic, methods to authenticate AI agents when they use web services are increasingly important from a security and monitoring standpoint. Key challenges toward effective agent authentication lie in the development and standardisation of protocols (e.g. South).
3.2.2 Technical StandardsCompute and hardware tracking
Researching techniques and gathering intelligence to monitor the distribution of AI hardware, both legal and illegal, enables the assessment of risks of malicious and irresponsible use and the allocation of resources to promote beneficial use (Sastry).
3.3.1 Industry CoordinationLogging infrastructure
Monitoring and saving information about what AI systems are doing allows for informed scrutiny when harmful or unexpected events happen. As highly autonomous AI systems grow in their capability and influence, there will be a rise in harmful and unintended incidents from these systems’ actions. Having effective infrastructure to capture and save information about what these systems do will be key for improving awareness and accountability in the age of advanced AI agents (Chan). Logged incidents and the necessary infrastructure constitute another example of a potential area of mutual interest. Just as competing aircraft manufacturers voluntarily share data about aircraft accidents, companies or countries may find it in their interest to share and jointly collect information about serious AI incidents. Establishing shared incident reporting systems allows the field to collectively learn from serious failures and risks, ensuring safety and security to foster public trust in AI’s opportunities.
3.3.1 Industry CoordinationAssessing risk-management frameworks
Technical tools for risk management are only effective inasmuch as they are meaningfully integrated into safety frameworks. Just as it is key to evaluate and monitor AI systems, it is also necessary to evaluate and monitor risk management protocols for their effectiveness and robustness to single points of failure (e.g. human error). Currently, researchers’ ability to assess risk management frameworks is limited by the degree of transparency into how AI developers manage risks. However, monitoring the successes and failures of safety frameworks is key for risk management over time (Alaga).It is also an area of mutual interest due to the value of sharing insights on best practices and potential failures of risk management frameworks. Frontiers for future work include refining assessment frameworks and developing reporting infrastructure.
2.2 Risk & AssuranceRisk Assessment
The primary goal of risk assessment is to understand the severity and likelihood of a potential harm. Risk assessments are used to prioritise risks and determine if they cross thresholds that demand specific action. Consequential development and deployment decisions are predicated on these assessments. The research areas in this category involve: A. Developing methods to measure the impact of AI systems for both current and future AI – This includes developing standardised assessments for risky behaviours of AI systems through audit techniques and benchmarks, evaluation and assessment of new capabilities, including potentially dangerous ones; and for real-world societal impact such as labour, misinformation and privacy through field tests and prospective risks analysis. B. Enhancing metrology to ensure that the measurements are precise and repeatable – This includes research in technical methods for quantitative risk assessment tailored to AI systems to reduce uncertainty and the need for large safety margins. This is an important open area of research. C. Building enablers for third-party audits to support independent validation of risk assessments – This includes developing secure infrastructure that enables thorough evaluation while protecting intellectual property, including preventing model theft.
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Audit techniques and benchmarks
Techniques and benchmarks with which AI systems can be effectively and efficiently tested for harmful behaviours are highly varied and central to risk assessments (IAISR, Birhane-A).
3.2.1 Benchmarks & EvaluationRisk Assessment > Downstream impact assessment and forecasting
Assessing and forecasting the many societal impacts of AI systems is one of the most central goals of risk assessments.
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Secure evaluation infrastructure
External auditors and oversight bodies need infrastructure and protocols that enable thorough evaluation while protecting sensitive intellectual property. Ideally, evaluation infrastructure should enable double-blindness: the evaluator’s inability to directly access the system’s parameters and developers’ inability to know what exact evaluations are run (Reuel, Bucknall-A, Casper-B). Meanwhile, the importance of mutual security will continue to grow as system capabilities and risks increase. Methods for developing secure infrastructure for auditing and oversight are known to be possible.
3.2.2 Technical StandardsRisk Assessment > System safety assessment
Safety assessment is not just about individual AI systems, but also their interaction with the rest of the world. For example, when an AI company discovers concerning behaviour from their system, the resulting risks depend, in part, on having internal processes in place to escalate the issue to senior leadership and work to mitigate the risks. System safety considers both AI systems and the broader context that they are deployed in. The study of system safety focuses on the interactions between different technical components as well as processes and incentives in an organisation (IAISR, Hendrycks-B, AISES, Alaga).
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment > Metrology for AI risk assessment
Metrology, the science of measurement, has only recently been studied in the context of AI risk assessment (IAISR, Hobbhahn). Current approaches generally lack standardisation, repeatability, and precision.
3.2.1 Benchmarks & EvaluationThe Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities
Bengio, Yoshua; Maharaj, Tegan; Ong, C.-H. Luke; Russell, Stuart D.; Song, Dawn; Tegmark, Max; Lan, Xue; Zhang, Ya-Qin; Casper, Stephen; Lee, Wan Sie; Mindermann, Sören; Wilfred, Vanessa; Balachandran, Vidhisha; Barez, Fazl; Belinsky, Michael; Bello, Imane; Bourgon, Malo; Brakel, Mark; Campos, Siméon; Cass-Beggs, Duncan; Chen, Jiahao; Chowdhury, Rumman; Seah, Kuan Chua; Clune, Jeff; Dai, Jie; Delaborde, Agnes; Dziri, Nouha; Eiras, Francisco; Engels, Joshua; Fan, Jinyu; Gleave, Adam; Goodman, Noah D.; Heide, Fynn; Heidecke, Johannes; Hendrycks, Dan; Hodes, Cyrus; Hsiang, Bryan Low Kian; Huang, Minlie; Jawhar, Sami; Wang, Jingyu; Kalai, Adam Tauman; Kamphuis, Meindert; Kankanhalli, Mohan; Kantamneni, Subhash; Kirk, M.; Kwa, Thomas; Ladish, Jeffrey; Lam, Kwok-Yan; Lee, Wan Sie; Lee, Taewhi; Li, Xiaopeng; Liu, Jiajun; Lu, Ching-Cheng; Mai, Yifan; Mallah, Richard; Michael, Julian; Moës, Nick; Møller, Simon Geir; Nam, K. H.; Ng, TP; Nitzberg, Mark; Nushi, Besmira; Ó hÉigeartaigh, Seán; Ortega, Alejandro; Peigné, Pierre; Petrie, J. Howard; Prud'homme, Benjamin; Rabbany, Reihaneh; Sanchez-Pi, Nayat; Schwettmann, Sarah; Shlegeris, Buck; Siddiqui, Saad; Sinha, Ashish; Soto, Martín; Tan, Cheston; Dong, Ting; Tjhi, William; Trager, Robert; Tse, Brian; Tung, Anthony K. H.; Willes, John; Wong, David; Xu, Wei; Xu, Rong; Zeng, Yi; Zhang, Hao; Žikelić, Djordje (2025)
This is the first International AI Safety Report. Following an interim publication in May 2024, a diverse group of 96 Artificial Intelligence (AI) experts contributed to this first full report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). The report aims to provide scientific information that will support informed policymaking. It does not recommend specific policies…. This report summarises the scientific evidence on the safety of general-purpose AI. The purpose of this report is to help create a shared international understanding of risks from advanced AI and how they can be mitigated. To achieve this, this report focuses on general-purpose AI – or AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks – since this type of AI has advanced particularly rapidly in recent years and has been deployed widely by technology companies for a range of consumer and business purposes. The report synthesises the state of scientific understanding of general-purpose AI, with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. Amid rapid advancements, research on general-purpose AI is currently in a time of scientific discovery, and – in many cases – is not yet settled science. The report provides a snapshot of the current scientific understanding of general-purpose AI and its risks. This includes identifying areas of scientific consensus and areas where there are different views or gaps in the current scientific understanding. People around the world will only be able to fully enjoy the potential benefits of general- purpose AI safely if its risks are appropriately managed. This report focuses on identifying those risks and evaluating technical methods for assessing and mitigating them, including ways that general-purpose AI itself can be used to mitigate risks.
Other (outside lifecycle)
Outside the standard AI system lifecycle
Governance Actor
Regulator, standards body, or oversight entity shaping AI policy
Map
Identifying and documenting AI risks, contexts, and impacts
Primary
6.5 Governance failure