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Techniques to remove, bound, or modify learned model capabilities post-training.
Also in Model
Removing specific harmful capabilities (e.g., pathogen design) from models using unlearning techniques.
Multiple experts expressed scepticism about the effectiveness and feasibility of unlearning techniques. Several noted that these techniques are nascent, not well understood, and may not be robust in the long term. Several experts mentioned that unlearning might be circumvented, especially with open-source models or through fine-tuning. Several experts suggested that unlearning could be more effective for specific, concrete risks like chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks, or cybersecurity threats, where particular knowledge can be targeted. However, multiple experts doubted its efficacy for broader issues like bias, discrimination, or impacts on democratic processes, which are more complex and less clearly defined. Several experts raised concerns about potential unintended consequences, such as creating knowledge gaps or affecting the model's overall performance. One expert noted that capabilities are not cleanly separable, making targeted unlearning challenging. Some experts saw potential benefits, with one mentioning compliance with laws and regulations, and another suggesting it could enhance model security. However, these positive views were in the minority. Multiple experts emphasised the need for more research and a focus on evaluating outcomes rather than specific techniques. Several suggested combining unlearning with other mitigation strategies and oversight measures.
Reasoning
Machine unlearning removes specific harmful capabilities post-training.
Pre-deployment risk assessments
Comprehensive risk assessments before deployment that would assess reasonably foreseeable misuse and include dangerous capability evaluations that incorporate post-training enhancements and collaborations with domain experts. Risk assessments would inform deployment decisions.
2.2.1 Risk AssessmentThird party pre-deployment model audits
External pre-deployment assessment to provide a judgment on the safety of a model. Auditors, which could be governments or independent third parties, would receive access to a fine-tuning API for testing, or further appropriate technical means.
2.2.3 Auditing & ComplianceExternal assessment of testing procedure
Bringing in external AI evaluation firms before deployment to assess and red-team the company's execution of dangerous capabilities evaluations.
2.2.2 Testing & EvaluationVetted researcher access
Giving good faith, public interest evaluation researchers access to black-box research APIs that provide technical and legal safe harbours to limit barriers imposed by usage policy enforcement, logging, and stringent terms of service.
2.3.1 Deployment ManagementAdvanced model access for vetted external researchers
Examples of advanced access rights could include any of the following: increased control over sampling, access to fine-tuning functionality, the ability to inspect and modify model internals, access to training data, or additional features like stable model versions.
2.2.2 Testing & EvaluationData curation
Careful data curation prior to all development stages (including fine-tuning) to filter out high-risk content and ensure the training data is sufficiently high-quality.
1.1.1 Training DataEffective Mitigations for Systemic Risks from General-Purpose AI
Uuk, Risto; Brouwer, Annemieke; Schreier, Tim; Dreksler, Noemi; Pulignano, Valeria; Bommasani, Rishi (2024)
The systemic risks posed by general-purpose AI models are a growing concern, yet the effectiveness of mitigations remains underexplored. Previous research has proposed frameworks for risk mitigation, but has left gaps in our understanding of the perceived effectiveness of measures for mitigating systemic risks. Our study addresses this gap by evaluating how experts perceive different mitigations that aim to reduce the systemic risks of general-purpose AI models. We surveyed 76 experts whose expertise spans AI safety; critical infrastructure; democratic processes; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear risks (CBRN); and discrimination and bias. Among 27 mitigations identified through a literature review, we find that a broad range of risk mitigation measures are perceived as effective in reducing various systemic risks and technically feasible by domain experts. In particular, three mitigation measures stand out: safety incident reports and security information sharing, third-party pre-deployment model audits, and pre-deployment risk assessments. These measures show both the highest expert agreement ratings (>60\%) across all four risk areas and are most frequently selected in experts' preferred combinations of measures (>40\%). The surveyed experts highlighted that external scrutiny, proactive evaluation and transparency are key principles for effective mitigation of systemic risks. We provide policy recommendations for implementing the most promising measures, incorporating the qualitative contributions from experts. These insights should inform regulatory frameworks and industry practices for mitigating the systemic risks associated with general-purpose AI.
Build and Use Model
Training, fine-tuning, and integrating the AI model
Developer
Entity that creates, trains, or modifies the AI system
Manage
Prioritising, responding to, and mitigating AI risks
