AI rights and responsibilities

"We note literature—which gives us the domain termed Robot Rights—addressing the rights of the AI itself as we develop and implement it. We find arguments against [38] the affordance of rights for artificial agents: that they should be equals in ability but not in rights, that they should be inferior by design and expendable when needed, and that since they can be designed not to feel pain (or anything) they do not have the same rights as humans. On a more theoretical level, we find literature asking more fundamental questions, such as: at what point is a simulation of life (e.g. artificial intelligence) equivalent to life which originated through natural means [43]? And if a simulation of life is equivalent to natural life, should those simulations be afforded the same rights, responsibilities and privileges afforded to natural life or persons? Some literature suggests that the answer to this question may be contingent on the intrinsic capabilities of the creation, comparing—for example—animal rights and environmental ethics literature"(p. 686)