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AI Race (Environmental/Structural)
Corporate AI Race

Military AI Arms Race

An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks

Hendrycks, Mazzeika & Woodside (2023)

SourceDOI
Sub-category
Risk Domain
6Socioeconomic & Environmental
6.4Competitive dynamics

AI developers or state-like actors competing in an AI ‘race’ by rapidly developing, deploying, and applying AI systems to maximize strategic or economic advantage, increasing the risk they release unsafe and error-prone systems.

"The development of AIs for military applications is swiftly paving the way for a new era in military technology, with potential consequences rivaling those of gunpowder and nuclear arms in what has been described as the “third revolution in warfare.”(p. 13)

Entity— Who or what caused the harm

Human

Due to a decision or action made by humans

AI system

Due to a decision or action made by an AI system

Other

Due to some other reason or is ambiguous

Intent— Whether the harm was intentional or accidental

Intentional

Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal

Unintentional

Due to an unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal

Other

Without clearly specifying the intentionality

Timing— Whether the risk is pre- or post-deployment

Pre-deployment

Occurring before the AI is deployed

Post-deployment

Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed

Other

Without a clearly specified time of occurrence

Supporting Evidence (11)

1.
"LAWs increase the likelihood of war...autonomous weapons would allow an aggressive nation to launch attacks without endangering the lives of its own soldiers and thus face less domestic scrutiny. "(p. 14)
2.
"As well as being used to enable deadlier weapons, AIs could lower the barrier to entry for cyberattacks, making them more numerous and destructive..(p. 14)
3.
"AIs have the potential to increase the accessibility, success rate, scale, speed, stealth, and potency of cyberattacks"(p. 14)
4.
"Cyberattacks can destroy critical infrastructure"(p. 14)
5.
"Difficulties in attributing AI-driven cyberattacks could increase the risk of war"(p. 14)
6.
"AIs speed up the pace of war, which makes AIs more necessary"(p. 15)
7.
"Automatic retaliation can escalate accidents into war"(p. 15)
8.
"AI-controlled weapons systems could lead to a flash war"(p. 15)
9.
"Automated warfare could reduce accountability for military leaders"(p. 15)
10.
"AIs could make war more uncertain, increasing the risk of conflict"(p. 16)
11.
"Competitive pressures make actors more willing to accept the risk of extinction"(p. 16)

Part of AI Race (Environmental/Structural)

Other risks from Hendrycks, Mazzeika & Woodside (2023) (13)

Malicious Use (Intentional)

4.0 Malicious Actors & Misuse
HumanIntentionalPost-deployment

Malicious Use (Intentional) > Bioterrorism

4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm
AI systemIntentionalPost-deployment

Malicious Use (Intentional) > Unleashing AI Agents

4.2 Cyberattacks, weapon development or use, and mass harm
HumanIntentionalPre-deployment

Malicious Use (Intentional) > Persuasive AIs

4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale
AI systemOtherPost-deployment

Malicious Use (Intentional) > Concentration of Power

6.1 Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits
HumanIntentionalOther

AI Race (Environmental/Structural)

6.4 Competitive dynamics
HumanIntentionalOther
View all 13 risks from this paper →