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Incompatible strategies

Sub-category
Risk Domain

Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

"Incompatible Strategies. Even if all agents can perform well in isolation, miscoordination can still occur due to the agents choosing incompatible strategies (Cooper et al., 1990). Competitive (i.e., two- player zero-sum) settings allow designers to produce agents that are maximally capable without taking other players into account. Crucially, this is possible because playing a strategy at equilibrium in the zero-sum setting guarantees a certain payoff, even if other players deviate from the equilibrium (Nash, 1951). On the other hand, common-interest (and mixed-motive) settings often allow a vast number of mutually incompatible solutions (Schelling, 1980), which is worsened in partially observable environments (Bernstein et al., 2002; Reif, 1984)."(p. 11)

Supporting Evidence (1)

1.
"As a simple example, everyone driving on the left side or the right side of the road are both perfectly valid ways of keeping drivers safe, but these two conventions are inherently incompatible with one another (see Case Study 1)."(p. 11)

Part of Miscoordination

Other risks from Hammond2025 (42)