This subcategory includes the broad set of risks associated with the failure of an AI system to fulfill its intended purpose. The literature identifies four main situations in which an AI may fail to perform as expected or desired.
First, the AI system can fail if it lacks the inherent capability or skill required to perform a task or if this skill is poorly developed. The consequences may be particularly harmful in situations where an AI is required to reason at a human level about important moral issues but does not possess this capability. Cultural, individual, and temporal differences in ideas of what is "right" or "ethical" compound the challenge of endowing AI with appropriate and adaptable ethical standards that are fit for all purposes.
Second, the AI system can fail when it is not robust in "out of distribution (OOD)" situations: data or conditions that were not anticipated during its training phase. These failures may occur because the training data did not confer a particular skill to the AI or because the skill was learned in a fragile way that did not permit generalization to unpredictable and complex real-world environments.
Third, the AI system can fail or become unstable when it is unfit to handle unusual changes or perturbations in input data. These unusual changes could be due to environmental noise, invalid inputs, or adversarial inputs from a malicious attacker.
Fourth, the AI system can fail as a result of oversights, undetected bugs, or errors in the design process. A common design oversight is a lack of comprehensive technical safeguards to prevent unintended downstream uses or consequences. Critical design choices about the algorithm, optimization techniques, and model architecture can also directly influence whether a system is able to consistently perform its intended function, leading to possible harm.
Excerpt from the MIT AI Risk Repository full report
AI systems that fail to perform reliably or effectively under varying conditions, exposing them to errors and failures that can have significant consequences, especially in critical applications or areas that require moral reasoning.
Incident volume relative to governance coverage — each dot is one of 24 subdomains
Entity
Who or what caused the harm
Intent
Whether the harm was intentional or accidental
Timing
Whether the risk is pre- or post-deployment
A nurse at St. Rose Dominican Hospital refused to follow an AI sepsis alert that recommended IV fluids for an elderly patient with kidney problems, potentially preventing life-threatening complications.
Developers: Unknown Sepsis Alert Model Developer, Unknown Healthcare Technology
Deployers: St. Rose Dominican Hospital (henderson Nevada)
An Amazon delivery van became stranded on the Broomway, a dangerous medieval path in Essex, England, after the driver followed GPS directions to reach Foulness Island in 2026.
Developers: Unknown Gpssatnav Developer
Deployers: Unknown Gpssatnav Developer, Amazon
A Waymo autonomous vehicle struck a child who ran across the street from behind a parked SUV near a Santa Monica elementary school during drop-off hours on January 23, 2025, causing minor injuries.
Developers: Waymo
Deployers: Waymo
Vulnerabilities that can be exploited in AI systems, software development toolchains, and hardware, resulting in unauthorized access, data and privacy breaches, or system manipulation causing unsafe outputs or behavior.
324 shared governance docs
AI systems that memorize and leak sensitive personal data or infer private information about individuals without their consent. Unexpected or unauthorized sharing of data and information can compromise user expectation of privacy, assist identity theft, or cause loss of confidential intellectual property.
260 shared governance docs
Inadequate regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms that fail to keep pace with AI development, leading to ineffective governance and the inability to manage AI risks appropriately.
259 shared governance docs
Unequal treatment of individuals or groups by AI, often based on race, gender, or other sensitive characteristics, resulting in unfair outcomes and unfair representation of those groups.
181 shared governance docs
Authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish AI Institutes focused on national security. Directs support for interdisciplinary AI research, partnership, innovation ecosystems, and workforce development.
Instructs the Secretary of the Navy to develop a pilot program for generative AI and spatial computing in training. Requires assessment of feasibility compared to other methods. Directs a report on program results 90 days post-termination.
Establishes the Artificial Intelligence Futures Steering Committee by April 1, 2026, under the Secretary of Defense. Directs it to develop policies for AI adoption, assess AI trajectories, and analyze AI risks and adversary developments. Requires quarterly meetings and a report to U.S. Congress by January 31, 2027.