BackBargaining

Bargaining

Sub-category

Risk Domain

7AI System Safety, Failures & Limitations

Risks from multi-agent interactions, due to incentives (which can lead to conflict or collusion) and/or the structure of multi-agent systems, which can create cascading failures, selection pressures, new security vulnerabilities, and a lack of shared information and trust.

"Bargaining. As a classic example of these strategic considerations is that when agents attempt to come to an agreement despite diverging interests, information asymmetries can lead to bargaining inef- ficiencies (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983). Relevant uncertainties about other agents can include how much they value possible agreements, their outside options, or their beliefs about others. The essential reason for such inefficiencies is that, under uncertainty about their counterparties, agents must make a trade-off between the rewards of making more favourable demands and the risk of other agents refusing such demands"(p. 21)

Entity— Who or what caused the harm

Human

Due to a decision or action made by humans

AI system

Due to a decision or action made by an AI system

Other

Due to some other reason or is ambiguous

Intent— Whether the harm was intentional or accidental

Intentional

Due to an expected outcome from pursuing a goal

Unintentional

Due to an unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal

Other

Without clearly specifying the intentionality

Timing— Whether the risk is pre- or post-deployment

Pre-deployment

Occurring before the AI is deployed

Post-deployment

Occurring after the AI model has been trained and deployed

Other

Without a clearly specified time of occurrence

Supporting Evidence (1)

"This trade-off sometimes results in incompatible demands and thus bargaining failure, ranging from the impossibility of guaranteeing efficient trade between a buyer and seller with asymmetric information about how much they value a good (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983), to costly and avoid- able conflict when agents are uncertain about the capabilities and objectives of others (Fearon, 1995; Slantchev & Tarar, 2011). Because these failures stem from strategic incentives rather than a lack of capabilities, general advances in AI may not solve such problems by default."(p. 21)

Part of Information Asymmetries